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Abstract 
BPS, the Bayesian Problem Solver, applies 
probabilistic inference and decision-theore­
tic control to flexible, resource-constrained 
problem-solving. This paper focuses on the 
Bayesian inference mechanism in BPS, and 
contrasts it with those of traditional heuristic 
search techniques. 
By performing sound inference, BPS can 
outperform traditional techniques with signifi­
cantly less computational effort. Empirical tests 
on the Eight Puzzle show that after only a few 
hundred node expansions, BPS makes better de­
cisions than does the best existing algorithm af­
ter several million node expansions. 
1 Problem-Solving and Search 
Problem-solving may be formalized within the 
problem-space representation of [17], in which 
problems are specified by a set of possible states 
of the world and a set of operators, or transitions 
between states. A problem instance is specified 
by a single initial state, I, and set of goal states, 
G. The states and operators form the nodes and 
directed arcs of a state-space graph. Problem­
solving in the state-space requires applying a 
sequence of operators, or solution-path, to state 
I, yielding a state in G. 
1.1 Complete Decision-Trees 
Existing state-space search algorithms are adap­
tations of the game-theoretic techniques for 
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evaluating decision-trees. From the perspective 
of a problem-solver, the state-space graph can 
be viewed as a decision-tree, whose root node is 
the initial state. In this decision-tree, paths cor­
respond to sequences of operators, and leaves to 
terminal states of the problem. 
These leaves have associated payoffs, or out­
comes. In the two-player game of chess, for ex­
ample, the outcomes are win, loss and draw. 
Similarly, in single-agent path-planning do­
mains, the outcomes describe the desirability of 
goal states and the paths used to reach them. 
In theory, one can directly label each leaf with 
its outcome, and recursively label each internal 
node by assigning it the outcome of its most 
preferred child. Once the entire tree has been 
so labelled, the problem-solver need only move 
from the root node to the neighboring node la­
belled with the most preferred outcome. The 
MaxMin procedure[26) is a classic example of 
this constraint-satisfaction labelling technique. 
1.2 Traditional Approaches 
The complexity of state-space problem-solving 
arises from the fact that most interesting prob­
lems have enormous, densely-connected state­
space graphs. Because of resource (e.g., compu­
tational) constraints, most problem-solvers will 
be unable to explore the entirety of the decision­
tree before being forced to commit to an action. 
Rather, one will see only a relatively small por­
tion of the entire decision-tree, and must select 
an operator to apply before knowing the out­
comes of all adjacent states with certainty. 
How should a partial decision-tree be inter-
Increasing Heuristic Error 
Figure 1: Search Horizon and Heuristic Error 
preted? The conventional wisdom in both ar­
tificial intelligence and decision analysis is to 
evaluate the partial decision-tree as a decision­
tree proper. Examples of this approach in­
clude the "averaging out and folding back" tech­
nique in decision analysis[20], and the Minimax 
algorithm in artificial intelligence[25], both of 
which trace their origin to MaxMin. In these 
techniques, heuristics are used to estimate the 
(unknown) outcomes of the frontier nodes (the 
leaves of the partial decision-tree). Then, for 
computational simplicity, these estimates are 
assumed to perfect, thus licensing a. problem­
solver to invoke the straightforward constraint­
satisfaction algorithm described above. 
In assuming the labels to be accurate, these 
traditional algorithms are liable to be fooled by 
error in the outcome estimates. However, it 
is generally assumed that this weakness of this 
face-value assumption can be compensated for 
by searching deeper in the tree. 
The belief that error is dimished by search­
ing deeper stems from the assumption that the 
heuristic error grows proportional to distance 
from the goal. AB searching deeper causes some 
of the frontier nodes to approach the goal, the 
increased accuracy of these estimates is claimed 
to improve decision-quality. Thus the tradi­
tional algorithms are expected to converge to 
correct decisions with deeper search. 
As Figure 1 suggests, this line of reasoning is 
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fiawed. As comparatively few of the nodes ex­
panded in a. search are closer to G than I is (ex­
ponential branching compounds the effect visi­
ble in this planar graph), most of the estimates 
at the frontier are fraught with error. Even un­
der optimistic assumptions about heuristic error 
(e.g., bounded relative error), the likelihood of 
a traditional technique being misled by an erro­
neous estimate will increase with search depth 
(analytical and empirical studies can be found 
in [9]). Only if a search algorithm includes 
a sound inference mechanism for interpreting 
heuristic estimates can one unequivocally con­
clude that increasing search depth yields better 
decisions. 
2 A Bayesian Approach 
The Bayesian approach attempts to adjust the 
heuristic estimates in light of information from 
other nodes in the tree. Specifically, by model­
ling the error in the heuristic function as well as 
inter-node outcome constraints, one may deter­
mine, for each node, the probability of each pos­
sible outcome, conditioned on evidence provided 
by heuristic evaluations. In path-planning, for 
example, one would determine, for each node in 
the search graph, the probability distribution 
over possible distances from the nearest goal. 
In chess, one would determine the probability 
that each node leads to a win, loss or draw. 
Subsequently, one could take the action which 
maximizes expected utility[6]. 
To formalize this discussion, consider the 
search graph shown in Figure 2. From the root 
node, So, one must choose whether to move to 
St. S2 or S3. Let the (unknown) outcome of 
node s, be denoted by Oi. To make a ratio­
nal choice (i.e., maximize expected utility) one 
needs the beliefs 
P(Ot =a), P(Ot = b) , . . . 
P(02 =a), P(02 = b) , . . . 
P(03 =a) , P(03 = b) , . . . 
where a, b, ... are the possible outcomes. Unam­
bigously, let P(Oi) denote the vector of values 
(P(Oi = a), P(Oi = b), . . .  ) . 
Figure 2: Search Graph 
Once a heuristic evaluation for a.ll the nodes 
in the search graph has been recorded, one must 
determine the three v-ectors 
P( O,lh( So), h(S1), h(S2), h(S3), h(S2t), h(S22)) 
where i E {1, 2, 3} and h(Si) is the heuristic 
evaluation of node S;. This requires a model of 
the probabilistic relationships between heuris­
tic values and outcomes, and of the inter-node 
outcome constraints. 
2.1 Probabilistic Heuristic 
Estimates 
To determine 
requires an association between the values re­
turned by a heuristic evaluation function and 
the (unknown) outcome of the node which was 
evaluated. For example, if the only available 
evidence is the heuristic evaluation of node 51, 
then one would need to know P(Otlh(St)) to 
make a decision. In the best case, h(S;) would 
determine 0; with certainty, and no further 
search would be required. 
This probabilistic interpretation of a heuristic 
evaluation function, which we will refer to as a 
probabilistic heuristic estimate (PHE) [8], is a. 
heuristic function h together with a conditional 
probability distribution P( O;jh( Si) ) . An exam­
ple is offered by Figure 3, which shows the prob­
ability distribution over Manhattan Distance 
Figure 3: Probability distribution over Man­
hattan Distance Heuristic values (x) and Eight 
Puzzle outcomes (y). P(O;Ih(Si)) is a slice of 
this distribution (a fixed x value). As the heuris­
tic is admissible, it always underestimates the 
actual distance. Note that low heuristic values 
are perfect estimates of distance. 
heuristic values and Eight Puzzle outcomes (i.e., 
shortest-path lengths). 
This method of interpreting heuristic evalua­
tions allows new data to "calibrate" the PHE 
over time, as additional problem instances are 
solved, and does not require a priori assump­
tions about the accuracy of h. Additionally, this 
representation allows the principled combina­
tion of several heuristics or low-le-vel features to 
create more discriminating heuristic functions. 
2.2 Outcome Constraints 
The PHE provides information about the out­
comes of individual nodes. Additional knowl­
edge is required to link these individual pieces 
of evidence, constrain the interpretation of each 
in light of the others, and y ield a global inter­
pretation to inform a decision. 
In a path-planning domain, an obvious con­
straint is that the outcomes of adjacent nodes 
differ by at most the cost of the arc connect­
ing them. For example, if node A is 17 feet 
from the nearest goal, and is one foot away from 
node B, then B's distance to the goal must be 
between 16 and 18 feet (see F igure 4). Such con­
straints allow us to integrate new information as 
Figure 4: Path Planning Outcome Constraints 
it is uncovered, reducing the number of consis­
tent global interpretations of the search graph. 
For example, on learning that node C is 19 feet 
away, one may compose the constraints and in­
fer that the outcome for B is 18. This logical 
inference is merely a special case of probabilis­
tic inference: learning only that C is likely to be 
19 one should increase one's belief that B is 18. , 
The implication for problem-solvers is that 
information provided by nodes deep in the 
tree can tightly constrain the P( Oi), reduc­
ing uncertainty, and therefore enabling a more 
informed decision. Precisely, after evaluat­
ing a node Se, one's belief in different out­
comes is P(Oilh(Se)). Searching further, and 
evaluating n additional nodes { Se1 , • • •  , Sen} in 
the subtree below Si, changes one's belief to 
P(Oilh(Se), h(Se1) • • •  , h(Sen)). 
3 Bayesian Inference in Search 
The previous section presented the problem of 
inference in search, which is analogous to fit­
ting a surface (e.g., a terrain map) to raw data. 
Heuristic functions act as unreliable sensors, 
calibrated through the PHEs, while outcome 
constraints embody smoothness constraints on 
the surface. 
In this section, we discuss the mechanics of 
performing Bayesian inference in the search 
graph. As they are equivalent to those used 
in Bayesian Networks, we follow the notation 
Figure 5: Search Graph as Bayesian Network 
of [19]. 
Viewing the search graph (together with 
probabilistic heuristic estimates) as a Bayesian 
Network (Figure 5}, each node Si has an as­
sociated belief vector, P(Oi), or more prop­
erly P( OiiT), where T denotes the evidence 
observed in the partially explored tree. Pri­
marily, one is concerned with the belief 
vectors of the nodes adjacent to the root, 
P(Ot), P(02), P(03), which ultimately will 
form the basis of the decision. 
Consider that the heuristic function has been 
evaluated only at nodes 50 and S2. With no 
additional information, P(02IT), in this case 
P(02Ih(S2), h(So}, Oo), could only be evaluated 
by storing and examining an enormous joint 
probability distribution 
Fortunately, this can be decomposed by the 
chain rule to yield 
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P(h(S2) I 02,h(So),Oo)P(021 h(So), Oo) 
P(h(So) I Oo)P(Oo) 
and further decomposed due to conditional in­
dependence to yield 
P{h(S2) I 02)P(02 I Oo)P(h(So) I Oo)P(Oo) 
as the outcome constraints are assumed to spec­
ify all known dependencies. 
In the general case, the decomposition of 
P(OiiT) yields 
aP(Oi I T+8')P(h(Si) I Oi) IT P(T-81c I Oi) 
kEc(i) 
where T-8• denotes the nodes in the tree rooted 
at Sk, T+8• denotes T - T-8•, a is a normal­
izing constant, and c( i) is the set of children 
of i. Imagine the terms in this formula as be­
ing provided to the node s, via messages from 
its neighbors in the tree. Its parent sends it a 
vector of values P(Oi I T+8•), its children each 
provide it with a vector message P(T-81c I O,), 
and its heuristic value provides it with a vector 
message P(h(S,) I o,). Given these incoming 
messages, s, can update its belief and compute 
the corresponding outgoing messages. 
Note that in this procedure, the evaluations 
of internal nodes (e.g., h( S2)), considered su­
perfluous by traditional search algorithms, en­
able a more discerning interpretation of fron­
tier node evaluations (this resurrects an aban­
doned idea from Turing's hand-simulated chess 
program[16]) ). 
Example To illustrate the updating of beliefs 
based on evidence, consider the computation of 
the belief vector of the root node, S0, by con­
sidering the messages that are sent up the tree, 
beginning with the leaves. 
Initially, the heuristic nodes must send mes­
sages to their respective parents. H, for ex­
ample, we had evaluated node 521, with the 
heuristic reporting h( S21), then the value for 
the corresponding variable would be fixed. The 
node h21 sends to its parent, S21, a vector mes­
sage (ranging over values of 021) indicating 
P(h21 I 021). Consider that subsequently each 
heuristic node does the same. 
At this point, a node which has received vec­
tor messages from all of its children, e.g., S211 
can compute P( evidence below S21 I 021) or P(T-821 I 021), by multiplying these vectors 
and normalizing. It can then send a vector 
message (ranging over values of 02) to its par­
ent indicating P(T-821 I 02), computed as 
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Cluster 1 
Figure 6: Source/Sink Outcome Constraints 
Eo21 P(T-8
21 I 02I)P(021 I 02). This pro­
cess repeats until So has collected messages in­
dicating for each 00, P( all evidence I 00), i.e., 
P(T I Oo). 
Multiplying by the vector of values P(00), the 
prior belief in the outcomes of the problem, and 
normalizing, yields the belief vector P( 00 I T) 
by Bayes' Rule. A similar process yields a belief 
vector in each node (including heuristic nodes). 
As P(Ot), P(02), and P(03) are now known, 
a decision maximizing expected utility can be 
made. 
To perform inference in this manner requires 
a constant number of vector multiplications for 
each node in the search graph. Each vector 
multiplication is linear in the number of out­
comes or heuristic values (a constant over dif­
ferent problem instances). The space required 
is proportional to the depth of search, not the 
number of nodes. Thus, the asymptotic time 
and space complexity of this inference algorithm 
equals the lower bound over all tree-search al­
gorithms. 
3.1 Sophisticated Dependencies 
More sophisticated dependencies may also be 
modelled. For example, in path-planning, there 
is typically a "sink/source" constraint (i.e., only 
a goal node can be closer to a goal than all of 
its neighbors (see Figure 6)). 
This type of knowledge introduces additional 
Figure 7: Game Playing Outcome Constraints 
dependencies into the search graph. The out­
come of a node si becomes dependent on the 
outcomes of both its neighbors and those nodes 
two arcs away. However, knowing the outcomes 
of all of these nodes renders O, independent of 
the outcomes of all other nodes in the graph. 
Similarly, in chess, a node's outcome is not only 
dependent on its parent, but also on its sib­
lings, as pictured in Figure 7. Particular do­
mains may require that more dependencies be 
modelled, yet there appear to be no general de­
pendencies beyond these simple ones. 
These dependencies introduce loops in the 
graph, which invalidates the use of the tree­
based inference algorithm described above. 
Thus, a method is required for breaking the 
loops, for example, by clustering the nodes to­
gether into "macro-nodes" whose interdepen­
dencies form a tree[19] (see Figure 6). Process­
ing such clusters increases the complexity of in­
ference by a constant factor, as one must com­
pute probability distributions over all combina­
tions of outcomes in each cluster. Additionally, 
many heuristic functions will have the property 
that their values are dependent on the evalu­
ations of neighboring nodes (e.g., consistency). 
These dependencies may also be modelled and 
clustered. 
Another important though hidden depen­
dency arises from modelling the search graph 
as a tree, which causes "double-counting" of evi-
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dence, as many nodes in the tree may represent 
the same problem state. Experimental results 
suggest that this may have visible effects even 
in a small search tree. As the problem of propa­
gation of belief on a graph-structured Bayesian 
network has been shown to be NP-Hard[l], we 
are investigating approximation techniques for 
performing inference on graphs to overcome this 
simplifying assumption. 
4 Empirical Tests 
Minimin is a simple path-planning algorithm 
which consists of a full-width search to a fixed­
depth, followed by a single move toward the leaf 
node with the minimal heuristic evaluation (this 
process is repeated until a goal is reached). Min­
imin is interesting because it parallels both Min­
imax and A"', the classic two-player and single­
agent AI algorithms (it is a one-player version 
of Minimax which behaves identically to time­
limited A"'). The performance of Minimin was 
investigated in [5], and embedded in other plan­
ning algorithms (e.g., RT A*) in [14] and [15]. 
We compared Minimin to BPS on the Eight 
Puzzle domain to study whether a sound infer­
ence procedure could produce significant perfor­
mance improvements. The metric used in these 
experiments is the algorithm's decision-quality 
- the probability that it makes a move toward 
the goal- which we tabulate separately for each 
search horizon. As a control experiment, we also 
measured the decision-quality of an algorithm 
which applies randomly chosen operators. 
For each horizon d, we exclude states whose 
distance to the goal is less than d because in 
these cases, search would terminate at an ear­
lier horizon. Note that this experimental con­
dition, combined with the regular structure of 
the Eight Puzzle state-space, cause the decision­
quality of a random algorithm to increase with 
search depth. Consider, for example, the limit­
ing case of the furthest node from the goal, from 
which all moves are toward the goal. As is evi­
denced by Figure 8 (curve D), this phenomenon 
becomes increasingly likely as distance from the 
goal increases. 
The decision-quality ofMinimin on 10000 ran-
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Figure 8: Decision-Quality vs. Search Depth for 
Minimin 
dom.ly selected Eight Puzzle problem instances 
is plotted in Figure 8, the result of our repli­
cation of the experiment of [14]. � Figure 8 
(curve A) shows, Minimin appears to make bet­
ter decisions as more search is performed. 
However, Minimin's improvement in decision­
quality is primarily due to the presence of bea­
cons, or perfect information nodes, within the 
search horizon. An example beacon is a node for 
which the heuristic value perfectly estimates ac­
tual distance. � Minimin interprets heuristics 
at face-value, its decision-quality is artificially 
inflated by the increasing likelihood that bea­
cons will appear as search horizon is increased. 
Unfortunately, one cannot depend on the avail­
ability of beacons in complex problems. 
Hypothesizing that the results in [14] are pri­
marily a product of unrealistic heuristic accu­
racy and problem simplicity, we eliminated the 
perfect information from the search by altering 
the heuristic function at the 17 beacons in the 
Eight Puzzle state-space (of 181440 states to­
tal). The beacons are those states where Man­
hattan Distance E {0, 1, 2, 3} - of these, 15 
are within 3 moves of the goal state. These 
states were instead given heuristic evaluations of 
MD = 4, and the experiments repeated (curve 
C). In addition, an experiment was run in which 
the goal state provided the only beacon (curve 
B). 
As Figure 8 (curve C) indicates, remov-
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ing beacons cripples Minimin, which quickly 
reaches a performance plateau, in which the 
marginal improvement in decision-quality of 
further search is not worth the cost. Eventu­
ally, Minimin is little better than purely random 
decision-making, foreboding its performance on 
harder problems. Much of Minimin's perfor­
mance in curve A is due to a single beacon, the 
goal state, as indicated by curve B. Clearly, al­
gorithms which claim to make intelligent infer­
ences under uncertainty cannot secretly rely on 
perfect information. 
4.1 Comparing BPS and Minimin 
For the purpose of comparison, we tested a sim­
ple version of BPS, which performed Bayesian 
inference on a full-width, fixed-depth search 
tree, followed by a single move to the node with 
the shortest expected distance to the goal. The 
PHE was that of Figure 3, compiled from so­
lutions to all Eight Puzzle problem instances. 
BPS was tested on a random sample of 1000 
problem instances - the sample problems were 
sufficiently difficult that BPS never had per­
fect information available to it. The results are 
shown in Figure 9 (curve A). 
�+----------r----------�--�----� 
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Figure 9: Decision-Quality vs. Search Depth for 
BPS and Minimin 
BPS exceeded 70% decision-quality after less 
than 7 levels of looka.head (about 175 nodes), 
while Minimin (Figure 9, curve D) required 25 
. I 
levels of looka.head (about 6 million nodes) to 
reach that same decision-quality. Even this is a 
generous comparison, as the quality of random 
decisions from nodes at least 25 moves from the 
goal is itself nearly 69%. 
The PHE used in the above test is somewhat 
unrealistic, as it is derived from exploration of 
the complete state-space. Also shown in Fig­
ure 9 (curve B) are the performance results of 
BPS when equipped with a PHE interpolated 
from a sample of 1000 random Eight Puzzle 
problem instances, together with the 500 nodes 
nearest to the goal. The smaller sample slightly 
degrades the decision-quality of BPS, however 
it still outperforms Minimin by orders of mag­
nitude (requiring approximately 750 nodes to 
achieve 70% decision-quality, in contrast to 6 
million nodes for Minimin). 
4.2 Control of Inference 
As has been shown in [15], however, a prun­
ing mechanism exists for Minimin, which al­
lows it to search approximately 50% deeper on 
the Eight Puzzle than regular Minimin, in a 
given amount of time. Effectively, this shifts 
the Minimin curve (in Figure 9) one-third closer 
(from curve D to curve C) to the BPS curve 
(curve A). Despite the computational advan­
tage of Minimin's pruning, its decision-quality 
is only marginally improved. It is important to 
note that the results described above stem only 
from the power of BPS' probabilistic inference 
mechanism, to which one could add a selective 
evidence-gathering mechanism, the analogue of 
the pruning strategies used by many search al­
gorithms. 
Most branch-and-bound techniques (e.g., A* 
and a-f)-pruning) which assume the face-value 
interpretation of heuristics, prune by ignoring 
portions of the search tree which can be proven 
to have no relevance to the ultimate decision. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, however, few 
of the common pruning techniques can provide 
such guarantees. The explicit representation 
of probability within BPS affords the problem­
solver the opportunity to direct search using 
standard decision-theoretic mechanisms for or­
dering node expansion (i.e., value of informa-
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tion[12][13][21 ]). 
In principle, a search algorithm, just as it 
chooses the moves to make by considering the 
likelihood of different outcomes of an action, 
should choose low-level actions (e.g., performing 
heuristic evaluations, expanding nodes) with 
the same considerations in mind. To do so, it 
must be able to anticipate the immediate results 
of each action (what values can a heuristic as­
sume? how will that affect current beliefs?), and 
relate those results to long-term goals (will this 
information improve decision-quality?). Initial 
results in this direction are reported in[7]. Simi­
lar research, on decision-theoretic control, is be­
ing pursued by a number of researchers, as ap­
plied to resource allocation in planning [2][3], 
control of probabilistic inference[ll], and con­
trol of traditional search algorithms[5][23][24], 
having been suggested over twenty years ago in 
[4]. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have shown how Bayesian 
probability may be applied to the straightfor­
ward inferences required in search. In contrast, 
most search algorithms choose the default calcu­
lus of ignoring uncertainty in heuristic informa­
tion. Others, which do not adhere to the face­
value principle, represent alternative inference 
calculi for reasoning about uncertainty [10]. 
Further, we have demonstrated how sound 
uncertainty management enables decisions su­
perior to those of an accepted, ad hoc tech­
nique, and does so with significantly less com­
putational effort. Together, these indicate that 
a fundamental method underlying many AI sys­
tems, heuristic search, can be profitably viewed 
as a problem of inference from uncertain evi­
dence. 
Thus, we conjecture that in addition to 
the often-noted trade-off between "knowledge" 
and "search" in artificial intelligence, there 
is a third, and overlooked axis, "inference". 
In heuristic search, for example, "knowledge" 
refers to the accuracy of the heuristic evalu­
ation function, and "search", the number of 
nodes expanded (see ch. 6 of [18] for quan-
titative analyses in the context of the A* al­
gorithm, and [22] for a general discussion of 
the trade-off in AI systems). The third axis, 
"inference", refers to the interpretation of the 
knowledge accumulated from search- the com­
bination of evidence. Our experimental results, 
holding knowledge constant, suggests that a lit­
tle inference is worth a lot of search. 
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